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CHANGING NAVAL OPERATIONS 
AND MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Michael MccGwire 
Navies have long been a means of 
bringing military force to bear in distant 
parts of the world, and the purpose of 
this paper is to consider the impact of 
contemporary developments on this tra-
ditional instrument of great power 
policy_ 
In a naval context, military interven-
tion can include a cocktail party in 
Mombasa, a show of force in the Carib-
bean, naval interposition off Iceland, 
carrier airstrikes on Hanoi, or the land-
ing of marines in the Persian Gulf. I 
have chosen to concentrate on the 
application of force as opposed to the 
display cf force, for two reasons. First, 
our understanding of the processes 
underlying political influence building is 
still unclear, l and becomes even more 
so when we introduce the diffuse con-
cept of "a naval presence.,,2 And 
second, to the extent that a naval 
presence does have any political influ-
ence, this must stem from the ultimate 
possibility that the forces involved will 
actually be used. 
This discussion of military inter-
vention both at sea and by sea stops 
short at the beachhead, and military 
activity on land is only addressed to the 
extent that it is relevant to maritime 
operations. Similarly, although I touch 
on the political costs of naval interven-
tion, the more general question of the 
political utility of military force is not 
addressed because of limitations of 
space. 
However, so many assumptions 
about the contemporary role of force at 
sea stem from centuries past, that it is 
worth spending a moment on the rele-
vant changes in the international 
environment. Mahan, who chose the 
term "seapower" for its evocative ring 
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rather than its usefulness dS an analyti-
cal term, saw it as one of three inter-
locking circles, the other two being 
colonies and commerce. His theories 
about seapower and command of the 
sea derived from an historical analysis of 
the years 1660-1783, the height of 
mercantilism and monopoly trade, and 
were thought to have been validated by 
what G.S. Graham terms "The Illusion 
of Pax Britannica" in the 19th cen-
tury.3 But British naval power was not 
the sole or even the most important 
reason for the Pax Britannica, which 
resulted from a combination of various 
factors. Of these, the most important 
was "Britain's industrial supremacy, 
which made possible a phenomenal 
commercial development.,,4 The period 
of the industrial revolution provided 
both the means and the stimulus for 
Western nations to establish more or less 
effective dominion over a world which 
seemed to lack viable political entities. 
The process was accompanied by the 
spread of a Western administrative infra-
structure (part government, part com-
mercial), throughout much of the 
world, and was supported by a belief in 
"la mission civilatrice" and "the white 
man's burden," and Victorian ideas 
about child rearing and colonial govern-
ment. Among the most important were 
the will to empire, the readiness of the 
imperial authorities to use force, and 
the knowledge of their subject people 
that resistance would lead to certain 
retribution, even if delayed. God was 
white and to spare the rod, spoiled the 
child. 
Navies were prime instruments of 
such imperial retribution, and in those 
days of coal-fired ships and manually 
operated gun mountings, sizable bodies 
of well·armed men could be landed at 
short notice, while the warship lay 
virtually invulnerable offshore. As 
recently as the Boer War, it was still 
practical to dismount naval guns and 
drag them by oxcart to the battlefront. 
By World War I, attitudes toward 
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empire were already changing, and the 
Western imperial tide had begun to 
recede. But even in the thirties it was 
thought unexceptionable to bomb 
villagers in the Aden Protectorate as a 
form of collective punishment, and on 
the shores of the Malaysian Archipelago 
and the China Seas, villages were razed 
as a discouragement to piracy. 
Since the last war, attitudes and 
circumstances have changed radically. 
Of the latter, the most significant would 
seem to be the proliferation of nation-
states and their membership in the 
United Nations. The corollary of this 
has been the progressiv~ dismantling of 
the infrastructure of colonial occupa-
tion, which played such an important 
role in bringing imperial retribution to 
bear. There has also been a change in 
general attitude;; towards the accepta-
bility of coercive force. The circum-
stances in which long·range intervention 
is likely to be acceptable have been 
progressively circumscribed, and in the 
last 30 years, large-scale coercive inter-
vention by major powers has been 
successful only within their respective 
contiguous national security zones, 
where power gradients and political 
commitment are both high. Effective 
intervention overseas now requires an 
initial favorable balance of political 
forces in the "host" country, as well as 
sufficient weight of sustained response. 
But even if attitudes had not changed, 
warships would no longer be able to 
serve as the autonomous wielders of 
graduated retribution. The specialized 
demands of modern warfare mean that 
naval units now lack the military flexi-
bility of the prewar general purpose 
cruiser, with its numerous guns and 
comfortably large ship's company. 
Meanwhile, the proliferation of sophisti-
cated weapon systems means that no 
longer are warships necessarily invulner-
able when lying offshore. Sensors may 
have to be manned continuously with 
weapons ready at standby alert, and it 
may be hard to spare a landing party 
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without hazarding one's ship. The 
modern equivalent of the cruiser with 
its landing party is the carrier task force 
and its marine battalion landing team. 
But while the political effect that each 
could achieve may be comparable, the 
political stake is obviously very differ-
ent. 
None of this means that military 
intervention by sea is no longer likely or 
possible. But it has placed constraints 
on the almost casual use of force which 
used to be the norm. And it does mean 
that the economic and political costs are 
likely to be very much higher, and that 
the chances of a successful outcome are 
far less. However, while the utility of 
coercive force is increasingly in ques-
tion, the threat of such force remains a 
powerful diplomatic weapon. Irrespec-
tive of whether it ultimately achieves its 
goals, coercive intervention is an un-
pleasant experience for the target coun-
try, and a credible threat is likely to 
introduce some element of deterrence 
to its political considerations. 
There are two separate calculations 
involved in assessing the level of capa-
bility required for a successful interven-
tion overseas. First, there is the level 
and type of force which is to be brought 
to bear on the target ashore, whether it 
be naval bombardment, carrier airstrike, 
or men and tanks. And second, there is 
the capability required to get such a 
force to the target area by sea, and to 
sustain offshore operations as necessary. 
Our concern is with the second cate-
gory, which includes the possibility that 
passage may be deliberately obstructed, 
and may require the use of force to 
secure such passage. The policymaker 
will want to know the political costs of 
such ancillary operations, and how they 
compare with the political benefits that 
the major intervention is supposed to 
achieve. 
Maritime intervention is a complex 
subject, and I therefore begin by devel-
oping a discussion framework which 
allows us to consider the level of 
capabilities and the types of cost in-
volved. I then look at the major opera-
tional developments and their likely 
effect on military intervention by sea, 
before turning to review the different 
types of intervention and why they 
could occur. Finally, I consider certain 
differences between the Soviet and the 
U.S. approaches to overseas intervention. 
The Use of the Sea-A Theoretical 
Framework. The sea's strategic quality 
derives from the access it provides to 
nonadjacent areas. Maritime strategy is 
therefore about the use of the sea; using 
it for one's own advantage and pre-
venting its use to one's disadvantage, in 
peacetime as in war. This navigational 
use of the sea breaks down into two 
main categories: (1) the conveyance of 
goods and people, and (2) the projec-
tion of military force against targets 
ashore. 
The first category of use covers 
seaborne trade, which in a strategic 
context spells maritime communica-
tions. It also covers the movement of 
military cargoes in merchant ships, 
although this shades into the second 
category, particularly when a war is 
actually in progress. The shading is 
inevitable, since the military and com-
mercial uses of the sea form a con-
tinuum. While we can identify what is 
purely military, there are few com-
mercial cargoes which have no military 
value. For analytical purposes, there-
fore, it is impractical to distinguish 
between military and nonmilitary uses 
of the sea, except in the broadest terms, 
whereas the projection of force, and the 
conveyance of goods and people are 
functionally distinct. 
The second category has two forms: 
the traditional one of bringing military 
force (actual or latent) to bear on 
coastal states; and the deterrent form of 
targeting distant land areas with nuclear 
weapons. We are here only concerned 
with the traditional form. This may 
involve the landing of troops or may be 
limited to standing offshore and striking 
targets with shipbome weapons such as 
guns, missiles or aircraft. 
There is also a third, instrumental 
category: (3) the deployment of naval 
forces in order either (a) to prevent, or 
(b) to secure the two main categories of 
use. We all know that certain types of 
naval units also embody the capability 
for projecting force ashore, but the 
analytical distinction between categories 
(2) and (3) is worth preserving. It serves 
to emphasize that maritime strategy is 
wholly about the use of the sea and 
only incidentally about the use of force 
at sea. Naval forces are only necessary 
to the use of the sea if attempts are 
being made to prevent it. 
The ease with which use can be 
prevented depends on maritime geog· 
raphy and the type of use involved. A 
waterway (defined as any stretch of sea 
used for passage) can be described in 
terms of its geographic characteristics, 
lying somewhere on the continuum 
between narrow, shallow waters and the 
deep ocean. Narrow waterways, where 
ships must pass close to shore-based 
weapons, are relatively easy to obstruct, 
particularly if they are shallow and 
hence minable. It is much harder to 
prevent passage across an ocean water-
way, out of range of land and with 
opportunities for evasive routing. By the 
same token, different types of use in-
volve different capabilities and lengths 
of time at risk. It is usually easier to 
interrupt a flow of merchant shipping, 
than to prevent the passage of a naval 
task force. 
As a general rule, it is also easier to 
prevent the use of the sea than it is to 
secure such use. This is partly because 
the means of preventing use are not 
limited to naval forces, and in narrow 
waters they include the simple block-
ship, the mine and a whole range of 
shore-based weapons. Naval forces are 
more important on the ocean water-
ways, the submarine being the most 
universal long-range weapon, but even 
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here the task of preventing use can be 
shared by land-based strike aircraft and 
supported by satellite and shore-based 
surveillance systems. 
However, securing the use of the sea 
against opposition remains a predomi-
nantly naval task, at least the military 
means are primarily naval. There are, of 
course, other ways of securing use, 
including diplomatic pressure and eco-
nomic sanctions. 
We are now in a position to draw a 
box diagram, plotting the type of water-
way against the type of use, and in each 
box we can show the minimum capa-
bility needed to prevent the use of the 
sea in such circumstances. We are not 
able to show the level of capability 
needed to secure the use of the sea, 
since this will also depend on the type 
and scale of opposition, which will vary 
between cases. However, we can show 
the type of costs which will be incurred 
in using military force to secure the use 
of the sea against opposition. 
These costs can be economic, in the 
sense of increased demands on the 
domestic economy for defense expendi-
ture; or they can be political in the 
sense of adversely affecting relations 
with other states. The type of cost is 
determined by the strategic quality of 
the waterway. In the case of narrow 
waters, it is geopolitical, in the sense 
that it stems from a combination of 
geographical configuration and the 
political control of the adjacent coasts. 
A military response to an attempt to 
prevent passage through narrow waters 
therefore cannot avoid political costs 
and these will tend to be heavy, because 
it will usually require attacks on na-
tional territory. 
The strategic quality of ocean water-
ways is primarily military, and stems 
from the reach and geographical dis-
tribution of maritime forces, and their 
relative capabilities in the encounter 
zone. The costs of the military response 
to an attempt to prevent passage across 
the ocean are primarily economic and, 
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in the international context, the re- round obstructions to narrow water-
sponse can usually be contained politi- ways, and although ocean waterways are 
cally, unless it becomes essential to more difficult (because the obstructions 
attack shore-based support facilities. are mobile) some form of evasive rout-
Between these two extremes lie those ing is often practicable. This means that 
waterways which traverse open seas there is usually an alternative to in-
within range of land-based weapon and sisting on passage, and consideration can 
surveillance systems, where the strategic be given to the relative costs. 
quality will be some mix of military and The extra distance involved in 
geopolitical, and the costs part eco- accepting diversion can be expressed in 
nomic and part political. time and money, and this also will 
In the same context of securing use, translate into economic and political 
there is a distinction to be made be- costs. But in this case, the political costs 
tween the "terminal" and "passage" legs will reflect lost opportunities to influ-
of a waterway. Obviously, the terminal ence events, or the inability to meet an 
of one voyage can be the passage of important commitment. Political costs 
another, and the distinction will lie in of this type will only be incurred when 
the mind of the user. But it is somewhat timeliness is an issue, as, for example, if 
akin to the distinction between ends it involves the deployment of military 
and means and, depending on which force in response to a sudden crisis, or 
applies, it influences the relative ease the supply of a distant battlefront by 
with which use can be prevented, the sea at the outbreak of a war. 
range of options open to the user, the Our diagram is now complete. The 
costs of securing use, and the levels of boxes for Trade in the Terminal area 
political commitment. have been left blank to show that in 
The point of immediate interest is most cases the coastal state will be 
that very rarely is the passage leg the concerned to secure rather than pre-
only route between two terminals. It is vent such use of the sea. Where local 
therefore usually possible to divert conflict prevents such use, Trade and 
MINIMUM CAPABI LlTY NEEDED TO PREVENT USE: 
COST OF SECURING USE 
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Military Supply would have the same 
indexes. The political costs of securing 
use in Terminal areas are not shown, 
since they cannot be separated from 
the larger costs of the military inter-
vention. 
The diagram shows the minimum 
level of military capability needed to 
prevent use in the different situations. 
The assessment is intuitive, and I have 
arbitrarily divided military capability 
into six levels, reflecting both the range 
to which violence can be projected, and 
the degree. Level I (the highest) implies 
the capability for sustained attack on 
naval forces in midocean, and is 
possessed only by the United States 
and, in certain sea areas, by the Soviet 
Union. Level II implies a lesser capa-
bility which could attack a strong naval 
force, but not sustain an engagement. 
Britain has this capability in much of 
the Atlantic, and China is moving 
towards this in the Asian-Pacific. 
Moving to the bottom end of the scale, 
Level VI implies the ability to prevent 
the passage of merchant ships through 
narrow shallow waters, perhaps using 
contact mines laid by junks or dhows 
and protecting them from being swept 
with field artillery. Level V would be 
able to prevent passage through less 
constricted waters and might include 
torpedo and gun-armed coastal patrol 
craft. Levels IV and III lie in between 
these two pairs. Level IV could cover 
broader, deep-water straits and would 
include missile-armed craft and coastal 
installations, and a measure of shore-
based air support. Level III implies a 
greater offshore capability, either in-
cluding submarines or else reasonably 
effective surface forces, backed by 
shore-based airstrike. 
These descriptions are deliberately 
vague, because military forces tend to 
be unbalanced and do not lie tidily 
along a smooth continuum of capa-
bility. The levels do however give some 
idea of the leverage provided by mari-
time geography, and the extent to 
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which passage can now be controlled by 
coastal states in general, and straits 
states in particular. 
Operational Developments. Turning 
to the operational factors affecting 
maritime intervention, there have been 
significant developments in four main 
areas: advances in weapons technology, 
the dispersion of weapon systems 
among nonindustrialized states, the 
Soviet Navy's shift to forward deploy-
ment, and international attitudes 
towards the rights of maritime passage. 
The last of these is of a different kind to 
the other three, and will be disposed of 
first. 
(1) Erosion of Rights of Passage. 
Since the first two U.N. Conferences on 
the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, 
there has been a remarkable shift in 
world opinion concerning the balance 
between exclusive and. inclusive use of 
the sea. In 1958, the "traditional mari-
time powers" were still fighting for a 
3-mile territorial limit, and the South 
Americans claim for 200 miles was seen 
as preposterous. In 1960, the com-
promise proposal for a 6-mile Territorial 
Sea, with an additional 6-mile Exclusive 
Fishing Zone failed by one vote to get 
the necessary two-thirds majority. And 
yet by 1974, most nations, including 
the major maritime powers, had come 
to accept the much broader concepts of 
a 12-mile Territorial Sea and a 200-mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone, and argu-
ment focused on the scope of national 
jurisdiction within that zone. This 
tendency has been reinforced by claims 
that archipelagic seas should be con-
sidered ,as internal waters, and that 
marine pollution could threaten the 
security of a coastal state. The domi-
nating principle of "freedom of the 
seas" has now been seriously eroded, 
and specific claims have undermined 
both the concept and the right of 
"innocent passage" through territorial 
waters. 
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A new regime of "transit passage" 
may yet emerge, but the net effect of 
these developments has been to make it 
more likely that in the future, coastal 
states will challenge or even deny the 
right of passage to certain .categories of 
ships through waters coming within 
their various jurisdictions. It is also 
likely that such action will be seen as 
legitimate by many other countries, 
including perhaps the hundred or so 
members of the Group of 77. Passage 
through the Suez Canal and the Straits 
of Tiran were denied to Israel in the 
past, and would serve as a precedent in 
the future. 
(2) Advances in Weapons Tech-
nology. Such challenges to passage will 
be all the more threatening because of 
advances in weapons technology and the 
dispersion of sophisticated systems 
among coastal states. The former have 
enabled quantum jumps in such funda-
mental weapon characteristics as range, 
accuracy, payload and systems reli-
ability. These have been matched by an 
exponential increase in the capabilities 
of sensor and surveillance systems. 
By depriving the seas of their 
capacity for concealment, the improved 
surveillance systems have simplified the 
problems of ocean interception by war-
ships.\ They can also provide the target 
location data which allow long-range 
weapon systems to be brought to bear. 
Tactical systems with ranges from 300 
miles (cruise missiles) to 1,500 miles 
(aircraft) have been in service since the 
end of the fifties, but the emerging 
capability to strike moving targets with 
ballistic missiles at intercontinental 
ranges is introducing a new dimension 
to maritime warfare. As long ago as 
1972, the Soviet Union claimed that 
"naval groupings" were targeted by the 
Strategic Rocket Forces,s and we know 
that they are developing a homing re-
entry vehicle for a medium-range 
ballistic missile.6 We are now moving 
into an era where maritime warfare will 
be fought as much by land- as sea-based 
weapon and sensor systems, and it is 
becoming necessary to distinguish be-
tween the "reach" of different systems 
and to think in terms of "global" and 
(for want of a better term) "local" 
systems. In the middle ranges, such 
distinction will be somewhat arbitrary, 
but it becomes clearer if we allow that 
"reach" covers response time as well as 
range. Thus an IRBM would come 
within global systems, while a medium-
range bomber would be at the high end 
of the local systems. Perhaps more 
important is the concept that "global" 
systems are of a kind that can be 
launched from national territory (or 
from a strategically located submarine), 
to strike like a bolt from the blue at 
maritime targets in distant sea areas, 
across intervening seas or territory, 
whereas "local" system implies a more 
direct relationship between adversaries. 
Global systems will be extremely sophis-
ticated and expensive, and in the main 
they are likely to be limited to the 
superpowers. Several components for 
such systems are already in service, and 
it seems clear that the Soviet Union (at 
least) intends to adopt an integrated "all 
arms" approach to maritime warfare. 
While the global systems introduce a 
new dimension, improvements in local 
systems have been equally dramatic. 
The main instrument has been the 
terminally guided cruise missile, which 
allows a patrol craft to pack the punch 
of a battleship, and can be fitted to 
aircraft, surface ship, submarine or 
coastal defense installation. As im-
portant as the accuracy and payload of 
this weapon, is its range. This not only 
extends a coastal state's reach seaward, 
but the greater the range, the smaller 
the number of weapon platforms 
needed to cover a given sea area or 
stretch of coast. 
The homing cruise missile can be a 
deadly weapon against an undefended 
or unalerted target. But once the threat 
was properly assessed, it was 
appreciated that in many ways the 
cruise missile simplified the defense 
problem. Early missiles were transsonic, 
and provided a reasonably homogeneous 
target which, within the existing state of 
the art, could be shot down or seduced. 
In many ways this compared favorably 
with the previous situation, where the 
weapon was a torpedo, shell or bomb, 
whose flight could not be arrested. 
Effective defense was therefore predi-
cated on the destruction of the weapon 
platforms (submarine, surface ship or 
aircraft) prior to weapon launch, which 
was a very demanding requirement. The 
weakness of these systems had been 
their inaccuracy, but in the case of 
bombs and shells, this can now be 
overcome by the use of precision-guided 
munitions (PGM), which home on the 
designated target. Of course, the termi-
nally guided cruise missile remains a 
serious threat, and later generations are 
supersonic, harder to detect and more 
difficult to decoy or shoot down. 
So far, only strike systems have been 
referred to, but there have also been 
considerable advances in counterstrike or 
"protect" systems. These include elec-
tronic countermeasures (ECM), image 
masking and so forth, as well as weapons 
designed primarily for shipboard self-
defense. We have here the classic contest 
between attack and defense, and up to 
now it has been fairly evenly matched. 
But the advent of the tactical ballistic 
nrlssile and the prospect that it may be 
mounted in surface ship, submarine and 
ashore for use against maritime targets, 
raises the requirements for shipboard 
self-protection to new levels which will 
be hard to achieve. These ballistic strike 
systems' will be expensive and therefore 
reserved for high·value targets, but it does 
prompt the question of whether tradi-
tional surface warships will be able, in the 
future, to survive in a hostile maritime 
environment. 
(3) Dispersion of Weapon Systems 
Among Coastal States. These high 
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technology developments relate mainly 
to confrontations between the two 
superpowers in the context of general 
war. But since 1955, the industrialized 
powers have provided a steady supply of 
sophisticated weapons to emerging 
nations. Whatever the motives behind 
this supply, the effect has been to 
increase the ability of these nations to 
defend themselves against external inter-
vention and, in several cases, to prevent 
the use of their coastal seas. As an 
indicator of the latter capability, by 
1976 about 23 nonindustrialized states 
had been supplied with missile-armed 
surface units (or missile systems for 
retrofitting), 10 by the Soviet Union 
and 13 by the West; 14 such states had 
been supplied V{i.th submarines, 4 by the 
Soviet Union and 10 by the West, 6 of 
the latter being in South America.7 
These are by no means the only type of 
weapon which can be used to prevent 
the use of the sea, and besides other 
naval forces like torpedo boats and 
gun·armed surface units, there is the 
whole range of shore·based systems such 
as aircraft, missiles and coastal batteries, 
and fixed obstr~ctions such as mines. 
And all these weapons are being pro-
gressively upgraded. In the case of sup-
plies from the West, this is largely for 
commercial reasons. In the case of 
Russia, this is a byproduct of her 
economic system, which allocates a 
:fIXed share of resources to weapons 
procurement, resulting in the periodic 
replacement of all equipment by im-
proved versions. In this context, the 
Soviet SS-N-3 300.,rnile surface-to-
surface antishipping cruise missile will 
be superseded by the end of the seven-
ties, and may become available for 
selective supply to client states for coast 
defense purposes. 
The supply of weapons is one thing, 
their effective use is another, and this is 
why maritime geography plays such an 
important role in determining a coastal 
state's ability to prevent the use of its 
waters. It requires an experienced 
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submarine commander to bring a diesel 
boat within torpedo range of a target in 
open waters. And while range is not so 
great a problem to missile-armed patrol 
craft, they are very exposed to counter-
attack when away from the cover of 
land, and the state of the sea affects 
their operational performance. Mines 
are a cheap and simple way of pre-
venting use, but they can only be laid in 
relatively shallow depths, and are only 
effective if they cannot be circumvented 
or swept, factors which depend largely 
on the breadth of the waters. 
There is also the complex matter of 
what is needed for a nation to maintain 
and operate the weapons it possesses. 
We have the example of the buildup and 
decline of Indonesia's Navy, and the 
limited effectiveness of the Egyptian 
force, even though both nations have a 
seafaring tradition. The rapid deteriora-
tion of the Indonesian Navy was mainly 
a failure of maintenance, the lack of 
spare parts being a subsequent cause, 
and this underlines the problems of 
keeping complex equipment opera-
tional, particularly in hot and humid 
climates. When this is coupled with such 
evidence as the apparent superiority of 
Israeli pilots over their Egyptian 
opponents, one begins to ask whether a 
country requires some minimal techno-
logical base in order to make effective 
use of the latest weapons. On the other 
hand, North Vietnamese air defense 
units inflicted heavy casualties on the 
latest American aircraft, which suggests 
that perhaps it is as much a matter of 
priorities and commitment, as of innate 
capability. Meanwhile, the trend in 
weapon design appears to be towards 
increasing internal sophistication, 
matched by a greater simplicity in 
operation and maintenance, and this 
may come to compensate for the tech-
nological constraints. 
(4) The Soviet Navy's Shift to For-
ward Deployment. The fourth major 
development has been the Soviet Navy's 
shift to forward deployment. Although 
this has received the most publicity, in 
practical terms it seems to have had 
little real effect on either the capability 
or the willingness of the West to use 
their navies in support of military inter-
vention overseas. If anything, the last 10 
years has seen an increase in such 
activity. The presence of Soviet naval 
units in distant sea areas must obviously 
introduce a complicating factor to U.S. 
plans and impose costs in terms of 
higher states of readiness and increased 
surveillance requirements. But it has 
certainly not prevented America from 
active naval intervention, as we saw in 
the Jordanian crisis in 1970, the Indian 
Ocean deployments in 1971 and 1973, 
both Arab-Israeli conflicts and through-
out the war in Vietnam. Commentators 
who insist to the contrary tend to 
disregard the rise of nationalism, the 
Western withdrawal from empire, and 
the diminishing utility of coercive inter-
vention, and they ascribe the results of 
these historical trends to the presence of 
a few Soviet warships. Given the oppor-
tunities, Soviet gains have been re-
markably few. 
It is now generally accepted that the 
primary determinant of the Soviet de-
cision that their navy should shift to 
forward deployment, was the sharp 
acceleration in strategic weapons pro-
curement, ordered by President Ken-
nedy on taking office, and the marked 
increase in the emphasis on sea-based 
systems. This generated a Soviet require-
ment to deploy a counter against this 
threat to Russia from the "maritime 
axes," and resulted in the radical re-
structuring of the Soviet Navy. 
The carrier threat, which had been 
the Soviet Navy's primary concern since 
1955, yielded precedence to the threat 
from Polaris, and since 1961, anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) has received 
top priority in research and develop-
ment and in warship design. Between 
1957-1967, naval new construction 
entering service was heavily oriented 
towards the antisurface role, with SSM 
as the primary weapon. Since 1967, the 
emphasis has swung sharply to ASW, 
with additional priority being given to 
self-protection weapon systems on the 
larger surface ships. Except for one class 
of four ships (the rump of a cancelled 
program), all new construction major 
surface units which have entered service 
since 1962 are now designated by the 
Russians as large antisubmarine ships, 
the Moskva and Kiev classes being called 
antisubmarine cruisers. Two older 
classes of SSM-armed surface ships have 
undergone major conversion and have 
been redesignated as large antisubmarine 
ships. U.S. officials now refer to both 
Moskva and Kiev as "ASW carriers," and 
they have also acknowledged that the 
missile launcher tubes in Kara (called a 
cruiser in the West) carry antisubmarine 
weapons and not SSM, as had previously 
been thought. I assess that this also 
applies to the other three classes of new 
construction large antisubmarine ships, 
which have entered service since 1966. s 
Despite the shift to forward deploy-
ment, the Soviets are still building a 
navy for a narrowly defined, defensive 
mission, tailored for general war. If 
anything, this tendency is likely to 
increase as they continue striving to 
develop an effective counter to Polaris, 
Poseidon and then Trident. The con-
struction of distant-water surface war-
ships proceeds at a modest pace-about 
two cruiser-size and two destroyer-size 
large antisubmarine ships a year, and an 
ASW carrier every two-and one has the 
impression of an interim expedient, 
while the final answer to the problem is 
being developed. Submarines are a dif-
ferent matter and nuclear construction 
proceeds remorselessly at 10 units a 
year, while a new diesel program is also 
underway. The Soviet submarine force 
now comprises the primary antisurface 
capability and SSM-armed submarines 
operate in company with Soviet surface 
forces. This makes a powerful team, 
but its capabilities lie at the high end 
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of the spectrum of force and it lacks 
any projection capability. 
Although the presence of Soviet 
naval forces in distant sea areas increases 
the possibility of their use to hamper 
Western military intervention, the past 
10 years provide evidence of Soviet 
caution on this score. Of greater signifi-
cance is the future role of the new 
global weapon systems, and their poten-
tial as a deterrent to such operations. 
The overall effect of these develop-
ments in the law of the sea, advances in 
weapon technology and proliferation of 
sophisticated weapon systems, has been 
to make the sea a much more complex 
and potentially hostile operating en-
vironment. Attempts to prevent use 
have become more likely, and the 
capability to do so is much more wide-
spread. The near monopoly of naval 
power enjoyed by the West during the 
first two postwar decades has been 
steadily eroded. The reach of coastal 
states is being progressively extended 
and regional navies are beginning to 
emerge in such areas as the Arabian and 
China Seas, and the western South 
Atlantic. These developments do not 
imply that the U.S. Navy will lack the 
capability to project military power in 
distant parts of the world, or to secure 
the use of the sea for such purposes. Its 
ships were designed for war with Russia 
and should be able to operate in the 
face of Soviet hand-me-downs and sub-
optimal Western systems. But it does 
mean that the deployment of naval 
forces will need to be less of an instinc-
tive reaction and will have to take more 
factors into account, including the 
possibility of losses. It also means that 
self-protection systems will need to be 
given higher priority in each ship's 
weapons outfit. 
The Costs of Military Intervention by 
Sea. Military intervention can be coer-
cive or supportive.9 The distinction is 
not entirely clear-cut, since in the case 
of supportive intervention, the other 
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party can claim he is being coerced (e.g., 
North Vietnam), and in a coercive inter-
vention, a third party may be supported 
indirectly (e.g., Pakistan in the 1971 
Bangladesh war). The distinction is, 
however, useful, because of the differ-
ent levels of capability required for the 
different types of intervention, both on 
land and at sea. 
The proximate aim of maritime inter-
vention is either to secure the use of the 
sea, or to prevent its use. Preventing use 
is a relatively simple concept and we 
have as examples the U.S. blockade of 
Cuba in 1962, the mining of Hanoi in 
1972, and Britain's Beira patrol aimed 
at Rhodesia. These were all coercive. A 
supportive intervention of this type is 
the Guinea Patrol, established by the 
Soviet Navy in November 1970, to 
discourage further seaborne attacks on 
Conakry. Except for the Cuban block-
ade, all these interventions were by 
nonadjacent powers. 
(1) The Terminal Area. The concept 
of securing the use of the sea is more 
complex, raising the question of "use 
for what?" and sending us back to the 
categories in our box diagram. Focusing 
first on the projection of force ashore in 
the terminal area, we need to distinguish 
between coercive and supportive inter-
vention, and to know whether or not 
ground forces are involved. In the case 
of coercive intervention, the maritime 
environment will be hostile and where 
troops have to be landed and kept 
supplied by sea, it will be necessary for 
the Navy to secure command of the 
offshore zone and to be responsible for 
air superiority, until airfields are estab-
lished ashore. In constricted waters, the 
need to cauterize possible threats and 
forestall a surprise attack, will inevitably 
incur additonal political costs, particu-
larly if other states are close set, as for 
example in the Persian Gulf. However, if 
coercive intervention is limited to 
"punishment" by strikes from ships 
lying offshore, effective force defense 
systems may be all that is necessary, 
unless faced by a strong opponent and 
unfavorable geography. 
Supportive intervention is a very 
different matter, involving much lower 
risks and costs, even when ground forces 
are engaged. The presence of a friendly 
coastline and the availability of shore 
facilities for coastal surveillance systems 
and air support are important assets. 
When ground forces are not involved, 
the Navy's role is to bring prepackaged 
firepower to bear on the area of con-
flict. At the present time, this mainly 
involves airborne systems, and these can 
be used in various ways ranging from air 
defense to reconnaissance and close 
ground support, with the carrier serving 
as an offshore airfield. But the advent of 
precision-guided weapons and rocket-
aided shells may mean that gunfire 
support from surface ships will gain a 
new lease of life. 
Involvement by three or more parties 
in the terminal area is becoming increas-
ingly likely. When support is being given 
to one side of a local conflict, the 
temptation for the other side to attack 
the intervenor is very strong. Whether 
this temptation is kept.in check will 
depend on the other side's capability for 
effective action, its fear of the conse-
quences, and any external political con-
straints which may exist. Western "sanc-
tuary" theory has never been very per-
suasive and the spread of potent 
weapons, the existence of leaders like 
Qdaffi and Amin, and, where subma-
rines and missiles are concerned, the 
difficulties of pinning down responsi-
bility, all combine to make it unwise for 
major powers to assume that smaller 
nations whose interests are threatened, 
will not dare to retaliate. Outside 
powers who are not parties to the local 
dispute may also become involved. For 
example, the emerging regional powers 
may react against external intrusion into 
an area where they themselves are com-
peting for influence. But the more 
interesting case is involvement by other 
superpowers, and the prospects for this 
type of confrontation and its conse-
quences are discussed in the following 
section. 
So much for the terminal area. But 
to intervene, one must first get there in 
time to achieve one's purpose, and then 
if necessary sustain the operation by 
sea. This brings us to the question of 
securing passage. 
(2) Securing Passage. Narrow waters 
or straits offer the best opportunities 
for obstructing passage, and ignoring the 
question of plausibility for the moment, 
we can consider what ought to be done 
to secure use, should that happen. 
Ideally, the answer should stem from a 
comparison of the political costs and 
benefits of the possible courses of 
action. We start with the political gains 
that are supposed to accrue from the 
main military intervention in the termi-
nal area. Against this we set the political 
costs of insisting on passage through the 
narrow waterway against the wishes of 
the littoral state(s), which may involve a 
subsidiary military intervention. And if 
there is an alternative way of getting to 
the terminal area, we assess the political 
and economic costs of accepting such a 
diversion. 
The political costs of forcing passage 
must depend on the particular circum-
stances, but to some extent it will 
reflect the bloodiness of the battle. This 
will stem from military factors such as 
relative capabilities, distance from land, 
length of time within range of attack, 
capacity for point defense, depth of 
water, the likelihood of third-party 
intervention and the type of land-based 
weapons available to the littoral state. 
There is also the type of use. It is one 
thing to burst through deepwater straits 
with a carrier group; it is another to 
laboriously sweep a passage through 
mined waters within artillery range of 
land; and to secure a continuous flow of 
shipping through hostile narrow waters 
is very hard to achieve, and probably 
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requires that key points on the coast be 
occupied. One can postulate a general 
relationship between the costs of 
forcing a passage in peacetime, and the 
depth and width of the waterway and 
the time in transit. To force a long 
passage through narrow, shallow waters 
is likely to have high political costs, 
which stem mainly from the need to 
take action against the national territory 
of the littoral states. 
( :3 ) Accepting Diversion. Setting 
aside questions of "prestige" and 
"precedent," the costs of accepting 
diversion will depend on the extra dis-
tances involved. This can be expressed 
in time and money, and will translate 
into economic and political costs. In 
most cases, the costs will be predomi-
nantly economic (although these may 
have domestic implications), but ex-
ternal political costs will be incurred in 
a time-urgent situation. Russia would be 
faced with such a situation in the event 
of war with China, since she would 
almost certainly have to supply her Far 
Eastern front by sea. The length of the 
delay before the regular flow of supplies 
began to arrive in the Far East would be 
directly related to the length of passage, 
and Russia has a vital interest in en-
suring that the shortest route (Suez 
Canal and Malacca Strait) is not ob-
structed. The next shortest route (via 
Panama) is half as long again. In the case 
of the United States, it is more likely to 
involve the reactive deployment of a 
carrier force from the Pacific into the 
Indian Ocean, in circumstances where 
the fate of a client regime depends on 
support arriving within a limited period 
of time. But in this example, the politi-
cal costs can be translated into eco-
nomic costs in the longer run. If it were 
essential to be able to intervene in both 
the Indian Ocean and the Western 
Pacific, extra carriers could be procured 
and deployed on both sides of the 
archipelagic barrier. 
In all other circumstances, time and 
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distance can usually be translated into 
dollars and cents straightaway. In pre· 
planned military interventions, the extra 
distance can be covered by looking 
ahead and sailing earlier. Cyclical de· 
ployments like Polaris patrols can be 
handled by increasing the number of 
units, reducing time in rest and main-
tenance, or changing crews in the for-
ward area. Continuous flow operations 
like logistic support and military supply 
can be met by placing additional bot-
toms in the shipping pipeline. 
We cannot rule on the comparative 
cost-benefit balance without knowing 
the particular circumstances. But it 
would seem that when timeliness is not 
a problem and when an alternative route 
exists, even if it is twice as long, the 
costs of accepting a diversion while 
negotiating the use of a waterway, are 
likely to be considerably less than those 
incurred in forcing passage. Even when 
time is critical the costs must be 
weighed carefully against the benefits to 
be achieved at the far end. 
For the same general reasons, the 
denial of passage to commercial 
shipping will rarely justify the costs of 
military intervention. Not only can the 
merchant ships usually be diverted, but 
it is also possible to send the goods by 
other means such as pipeline, rail or 
road. Where shipping continues to be 
used, it is the relative increase in dis-
tance which is important and its effect 
on shipping costs as a share of the final 
price of the product. It is hard to 
generalize about this, because although 
there is a direct relationship between 
the length of passage and the cost of 
providing shipping services, the extent 
to which the price of shipping actually 
reflects these costs varies between 
trades. However, shipping represents a 
comparatively small proportion of the 
total cost of imports, and as a general 
rule, the effect of making a major 
diversion is likely to be no greater than 
the effect of normal fluctuations in 
commodity prices and charter rates. For 
example, if we postulate that all the 
straits through the Indonesian Archi-
pelago are closed, and all shipping from 
the Indian Ocean has to pass south 
about Australia, and then make the 
worst case assumptions about freight 
rates, this would only raise the cost of 
living in Japan by under I percent. 1 0 
And yet 40 percent of Japan's imports 
normally pass through these straits, in-
cluding 80 percent of her oil. There 
would, of course, be some dislocation of 
supplies while the first ships steamed 
the longer routes, but there are 
numerous examples of how rapidly 
international trade adapts to new 
circumstances, and dislocations are 
likely to be temporary. 
(4) Obstructions to Passage. How 
likely is it that littoral states would seek 
to prevent the use of narrow water-
ways? In most cases, they have a vested 
interest in the continuous flow of trade 
and shipping through these waters, and 
their economies would be damaged by a 
prolonged diversion. The closest prece-
dent is the blocking of the Suez Canal 
by Egypt in 1956, but this was in 
response to an Anglo-French assault. 
Littoral states may wish to use their 
monopoly power to extract rent from a 
geographical asset, and might threaten 
various restrictions if their demands 
were not met. But so far their position 
in this regard has been moderate, re-
flecting reasonable concerns for the 
dangers inherent in the passage of very 
large crude carriers and comparable 
ships through narrow waters, and the 
devastation it could cause to their 
shores. In this they can expect a fair 
amount of international support. But 
there would be little for a general toll 
on all types of cargo, because most 
countries now have a vested interest in 
lower shipping costs. An unprovoked 
attempt to hold the international 
community to ransom by preventing use 
of such waterways would be bound 
to leave the littoral states worse off 
than when they started, and undoubt-
edly they appreciate this. 
Provocation is another matter. Na-
tional sovereignty is such a sensitive 
attribute among newly emergent nations 
that its infringement would be accepted 
as due cause by many of the less 
developed countries, even if their conse-
quential actions damaged their immedi-
ate interests. For this reason, the pas-
sage of warships, amphibious forces and 
military supplies falls into a different 
category to normal trade, particularly 
when the forces are intended for use 
against some friend of the littoral state, 
or in support of some enemy. We have 
seen the use of the oil weapon to bring 
pressure on Western nations during the 
Arab-Israeli war, which had tactical as 
well as strategic consequences. Denial of 
passage through strategic waterways 
could be used in the same way. Whether 
it would is another matter. Turning off 
the oil did no damage to the supplying 
countries; rather the reverse. But a 
littoral state which sought to prevent 
the passage of U.S. forces would have to 
assume that its territory would be 
attacked. While it is true that not all 
states speak the language of interest, 
and that when international passions are 
roused, reactions tend to be unpredict-
able, that would still be a heavy price to 
pay in support of a distant state and the 
diffuse aims of a loose ideological bloc. 
The degree of political commitment 
is central to the use of force, which is 
why attempts to prevent the passage of 
military supplies are more likely in the 
terminal area. The absence of such 
attempts in the past probably reflects a 
lack of capability rather than the will to 
make the attempt. And in the case of 
Vietnam, it seems likely that the Soviet 
Union did not wish to jeopardize her 
maritime supply line to Haiphong, lest 
Hanoi be forced to rely on overland 
support from China. However, the U.S. 
mining of Haiphong has now "legiti-
mized" a whole new range of actions in 
the terminal area, and in future conflicts 
599 
the client state may be provided with 
the means to interfere with the ship-
ment of military supplies. 
This leads to the question of whether 
military intervention is likely against the 
ocean waterways. To start with the 
more general case of international trade, 
it is sometimes argued that because the 
West is so depenclent on the shipment of 
oil from the Middle East, therefore the 
Soviet Union will be tempted to attack 
the line of supply; this is a modern 
variant of the more venerable bogey 
that because Europe depends heavily on 
imports, therefore it would be in 
Russia's interests to initiate submarine 
commerce war in the North Atlantic. 
This is a classic example of the fallacy 
that what hurts oneself must help one's 
enemy, and can be shown to be im-
plausible for a whole range of reasons. 
Outside the circumstances of world war, 
it is near impossible to identify circum-
stances in which it would be in the 
Soviet Union's interests to initiate 
commerce war, least of all in the 
Arabian Sea. The reasons range from 
comparative military capability to 
political and economic costs and al-
ternative instruments of policy, and 
include Russia's own interest in mari-
time stability and freedom of the seas, 
which still remain largely within the gift 
of the West. I I In general, the diffuse 
nature of international seaborne trade is 
its own best protection, since most 
nations have an interest in the principle 
of safe passage for merchant ships in 
peacetime. Meanwhile, as the number of 
national merchant fleets grows, so too 
does the extent to which all ships are in 
hostage to each other. 
The shipment of IDuitary supplies is a 
different matter. So far, the convention 
has been observed that attacks on the 
lines of supply have been limited to the 
territory and coastal waters of the pri-
mary belligerents or client states. With 
the growing number of states possessing 
submarines, it is not certain that this 
convention will hold. The United States 
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went close to breaching it during the 
Cuban missile crisis, but this could be 
justified by the nature of the Soviet 
initiative, and on the grounds that Cuba 
was within the American national 
security zone. But the latter justifica-
tion can be claimed by China in its 
adjacent sea areas, and it now has a 
force of more than 70 submarines. 
While the midocean interdiction of mili-
tary supply lines remains unlikely, the 
probability is therefore increasing that 
they will be liable to attack or other 
forms of interference as they near the 
terminal areas. 
Maritime Intervention and the Super-
powers. 
(1) The United States. Russia and 
America have somewhat -different 
approaches to overseas intervention, 
both in their historical experience and 
in their current assessments. I will not 
dwell on the American case except to 
note that she was both the offspring and 
the inheritor of Western attitudes, ex-
perience and tradition in this area, to 
which she then added her own. Since 
the end of the 19th century, the U.S. 
Navy has been an important instrument 
of policy, an instrument whose poten-
tial was vastly increased by its develop· 
ment during World War II. America 
ended the war as the world's paramount 
power, with a Navy second to none and 
soon found herself at the head of a 
Western maritime coalition which had a 
virtual monopoly of seapower, and this 
was used to some effect in the following 
decades. The U.S. Navy includes an 
organic Air Force which for a long time 
was the third largest in the world (after 
the USAF and the Soviet force), and a 
Marine Corps which is larger and better 
armed than most national armies. The 
"peacetime" employment of naval 
forces has been a dominant considera-
tion and has generated its own substan-
tial force requirements. During the 
past 30 years there has probably been 
a greater use of navies in this way than 
at any comparable period. 
(2) The Soviet Union. Russian naval 
history goes back to before America 
gained her independence. But tradi-
tionally, the navy has been seen as an 
expensive necessity, rather than as an 
instrument of worldwide policy. From 
the first half of the 19th century, 
Russia's naval policy was increasingly 
dominated by the requirement to de· 
fend four widely separated fleet areas 
against maritime powers who could con-
centrate their forces at will. This same 
attitude persists in the present-day 
Soviet Union, where the defense estab· 
lishment is dominated by ground force 
officers and where there appear to be 
considerable doubts about the value of 
military intervention overseas. This is 
reflected in the shape of the Soviet 
Navy, which lacks a distant-water inter-
vention capability and is structured for 
the war-related task of posing a perma-
nent counter to the West's seaborne 
strategic delivery systems. The primary 
maritime instrument of foreign policy is 
the merchant fleet, which carries trade, 
aid and arms supplies to client states 
and other countries, and whose well· 
disciplined crews project the Soviet 
presence ashore. 1 2 
(3) The Overseas Role of a Soviet 
Military Presence. It would, however, 
seem that between 1969 and 1973, 
there was a sustained debate within the 
Soviet Union concerning the use of 
armed forces in support of international 
goals. 1 3 The causes and the results of 
this debate are still obscure, but it 
appears that in 1969, under pressure of 
the rapidly deteriorating situation in 
Egypt, the political leadership agreed to 
commit Soviet armed forces overseas, 
thus taking the first step down the road 
of a traditional Western·style policy 
towards the projection of military 
power. This major policy decision was 
followed by the deployment of Soviet 
air defense systems to Egypt in the 
spring of 1970. It would appear, how-
ever, that as events unfolded and as the 
costs and implications of such involve-
ment became clearer, the arguments of 
those who opposed the original shift in 
policy were strengthened, until they 
were able to reverse the deployment 
decision. However, the final policy on 
the role of a "Soviet military presence" 
had yet to be agreed, and it seems that 
the debate continued for a further 
12-15 months until a compromise was 
reached. By May 1973, it appears to 
have been decided that direct Soviet 
involvement overseas would be limited 
to the provision of advisers, weapons 
and strategic logistic support, the com-
bat role being delegated to the Soviet-
equipped forces of "revolutionary" 
states such as North Korea,Vietnam and 
Cuba. 
The outcome appears to be a policy 
which ensures the Soviet Union the best 
of both worlds; namely, being able to 
affect the outcome of an overseas con-
flict with direct battlefield support, 
while ensuring that political commit-
ment and liability remain strictly 
limited. This is achieved by (a) facili-
tating the arrangements and providing 
the lift to bring cobelligerent forces to 
the zone of conflict; (b) ensuring that 
the client state or regime receives ade-
quate military supplies in the course of 
the battle; and (c) remaining silent 
about Soviet involvement until success 
is assured. Of course, a corollary of such 
a policy is that it only allows the 
supportive use of Soviet military force; 
the coercive use must be achieved 
through proxies. 
In terms of force projection, the 
major instruments of this policy appear 
to be the merchant fleet and the mili-
tary and civil air transport fleets. The 
Soviet Navy has made some contribu-
tion, as for example the sealift of 
Moroccan troops by landing ship to 
Syria in April and July 1973, the use of 
landing ships to ferry military supplies 
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from the Black Sea to Syria during the 
October 1973 war, and the use of the 
landing ships based on Berbera to move 
supporters of the Dhofari rebellion to 
Oman. This naval contribution is mar-
ginal by comparison with men and 
supplies shipped by other means, and 
the emphasis on the peacetime employ-
ment of Soviet naval forces is in other 
directions. 
(4) The Navy's Peacetime Role. The 
1967 Arab-Israeli war, which gave the 
Soviet Navy its much-needed access to 
Egyptian shore facilities, also marked 
the start of the second and more distant 
phase of the shift to forward deploy-
ment, as Soviet naval forces moved out 
into the Caribbean, off the west coast of 
Africa and into the northwest quadrant 
of the Indian Ocean. Thereafter, politi-
cal exploitation of the presence of 
Soviet warships in distant sea areas 
steadily increased. In 1970 there was a 
marked change in the trend, with naval 
detachments being deployed specifically 
for peacetime (as opposed to war-
related) tasks, but this activity leveled 
off in 1972-73. Soviet pronouncements 
refer to the navy's peacetime role in 
general terms as "defending (or secur-
ing) state interests," a nebulous formu-
lation, whose scope has yet to be 
systematically researched. While not 
losing sight of the all-encompassing 
scope of this phrase, it 'is useful to 
discuss Soviet naval activity in terms of 
four major categories: establishing a 
strategic infrastructure; countering 
imperialist aggression; increasing pres-
tige and influence; and protecting Soviet 
lives and property. 
The first and most important cate-
gory covers the task of establishing the 
physical, political and operational infra-
structure required to support two quite 
distinct war-related tasks, namely: 
posing a permanent counter in peace-
time to Western sea-based strategic 
delivery systems; and securing the safe 
and timely arrival of military supplies to 
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the Far Eastern front, in the event of 
war with China. I 4 
The geographical extent of the first 
requirement can be seen by drawing 
1,500 n.m. and 2,500 n.m. circles cen-
tered on Moscow, which show the arcs 
of threat from the Polaris A-2 and A-3 
missiles. The smaller circle takes in the 
South Norwegian Sea and the Eastern 
Mediterranean and explains the heavy 
pressure brought on Egypt from 1961 
onwards, to provide base facilities to 
support the Soviet Navy's forward de-
ployment.1 5 The larger circle takes in 
the eastern half of the Atlantic and 
much of the Arabian Sea, running from 
the tip of Greenland to cut the west 
coast of Africa abreast the Cape Verde 
Islands, and crossing the Indian Ocean 
between the Hom of Africa and Bom-
bay. This explains the Soviet Union's 
persistent interest in the politically 
insignificant West African states, and 
her initial move into Somalia in 1969, 
despite the latter's talent for acquiring 
political enemies both in Africa and on 
the Arabian peninsula.1 6 Meanwhile, 
Cuba gives access to the departure ports 
on the east coast of the United States, 
and (with West Africa) covers the sea 
lines of communication with the Medi-
terranean. 
The second strategic requirement, to 
secure the sea lines of communication 
with the Far East front, explains the 
increased involvement in Somalia which 
followed after Marshal Grechko's visit in 
February . 1972. Concern about the 
Chinese threat in the Far East began to 
crystallize after the 9th Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in April 
1969; this saw the emergence of what 
the Soviets perceived as a military-
bureaucratic elite which was basically 
antagonistic to Russia. Following the 
series of incidents on the Ussuri River, 
the Soviet Union increased the buildup 
of its forces in the border region of 
China, and presumably this would have 
prompted a review of the arrangements 
for logistic support in the event of war. 
Reliance could not be placed on the 
Trans-Siberian Railway and supplies 
would have to be shipped by sea. The 
reasons for shifting the Soviet focus 
from Egypt to Somalia are likely to be 
similar to those which prompted the 
British to start constructing a major 
base in Kenya in the late 1940's, as an 
alternative to the existing one in the 
Canal Zone. The decision to build up 
the Somalian facilities was taken at least 
6 months before the withdrawal from 
Egypt, and it seems likely that Sadat's 
request suited the Soviet's purposes.1 7 
Turning to the second category of 
"countering imperialist aggression," we 
should note that in the Soviet lexicon 
"imperialist aggression" includes the 
deployment of tr.S. sea-based systems 
within range of Russia. Because of the 
very different type of political commit-
ment involved, it is important to dis-
tinguish between the war-related task of 
posing a permanent counter to such 
systems, and the peacetime task of 
opposing/challenging Western military 
intervention against "progressive states" 
and "national liberation movements." 
In areas such as the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, where additional naval forces 
were deployed during the 1967, 1970 
and 1973 crises, this peacetime task is 
upstaged by the more important war-
related task of countering the U.S. 
carriers nuclear strike potential and, 
until the dangers of escalation were 
past, Soviet naval units unmistakably 
had this as their only priority during the 
first two crises. During the 1973 crisis, 
in addition to the carriers, they targeted 
the Sixth Fleet's amphibious forces,18 
and this may have been intended to 
deter the United States from com-
mitting ground forces to the battle 
ashore. There is, however, an equally 
plausible war-related explanation. The 
Soviets plan to seize the Black Sea exits 
at the outbreak of a major conflict, and 
their Mediterranean squadron has the 
additional task of preventing the Sixth 
Fleet from reinforcing the defense of 
the Turkish straits. 1 9 The primary mis-
sion during the 1973 crisis therefore 
remains uncertain. 
The first clear example of the peace-
time task of "countering imperialist 
aggression" was the establishment of the 
"Guinea Patrol" in December 1970, 
apparently to deter further Portuguese-
supported seaborne attacks on Conakry. 
The next example was the dispatch of 
Soviet naval detachments to the Indian 
Ocean in December 1971, in reaction to 
the deployment of British and U.S. 
carrier task forces prior to and during 
the Indo-Pakistan war. The most recent 
example was during the Angolan affair, 
when a Kresta class large antisubmarine 
ship was deployed south of Guinea and 
on past practice, one would assume that 
it had SSM-armed submarines in com-
pany. This placed the detachment in a 
blocking position between Angola and 
U.S. naval forces in the North Atlantic. 
The other two categories are of lesser 
interest to this discussion. The task of 
"increasing Soviet prestige and, influ-
ence" assumed a new dimension in 
1972, when the Soviet Navy undertook 
port clearing operations in Bangladesh, 
and it was also used to sweep the 
southern approaches to Suez in 1974. 
The navy's role in "protecting Soviet 
lives and property overseas" is best 
exemplified by the landing ships which 
take up station off Syria and Egypt 
when war breaks out with Israel, and off 
Angola in the 1976 conflict, and it 
appears that their task is to evacuate 
Soviet personnel if defeat is imminent. 
The only other example is the deploy-
ment of three warships to Ghanaian 
waters in 1969, which may have helped 
effect the release of two Soviet trawlers 
that had been held for over 4 months on 
conspiracy charges. 
Any particular operation may further 
the objectives of more than one of these 
four peacetime tasks. The continuation 
of the Guinea Patrol after the Portu-
guese threat evaporated in 1974, sug-
gests that its primary justification may 
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in fact have been to "establish the 
geostrategic infrastructure" by securing 
access to base facilities on the west 
coast of Africa. The same general objec-
tive may also have prompted the 
Ghanaian episode in 1969 and the 
politically timed visit to Sierra Leone in 
1971.20 
(5) Political Commitment to Peace-
time Tasks. It can be seen that the 
Soviet Navy's war-related task and its 
three main peacetime tasks are all in-
tended to promote the two primary 
objectives of Soviet foreign policy.· In 
order of priority, these are (1) to ensure 
the security of the Soviet Union, and 
(2) to increase the Soviet Union's share 
of world power and influence. It is 
useful to distinguish the peacetime em-
ployments of Soviet naval forces in this 
manner, because it clarifies the level of 
political commitment behind different 
types of interest and operation. 
It is quite evident from their pro-
nouncements, from the output of their 
defense production programs, and from 
the pattern of naval operations, that the 
Soviet Union gives high priority to the 
task of countering Western sea-based 
strategic delivery systems. To support 
this task they have been willing in the 
past to accept new political costs and 
commitments. Many of the paradoxes in 
the Soviet-Egyptian relationship since 
1961 can be explained by allowing that 
the Soviet Union had a near vital inter-
est in gaining access to shore facilities 
whereby to support her counterforce 
naval deployment in the Eastern Medi-
terranean. It is possible that there may 
now be somewhat less willingness to 
accept large political costs on this score: 
partly because of SALT-generated 
changes in Soviet perceptions of the 
threat of nuclear war; partly because 
war with China is now the more likely 
contingency; and perhaps partly because 
the new global all-arms weapon systems 
will soon be entering service and will 
relieve the dependence on shore support 
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in the forward operating areas. But the 
task still stands, and since it contributes 
to the security of the Soviet Union, the 
level of political commitment to secur-
ing the necessary geostrategic infrastruc-
ture will be of a different order to other 
types of overseas involvement. 
"Countering imperialist aggression" 
is a different matter, and the level of 
political commitment to this task has 
never been very clear. Certainly it is not 
worth risking war with America, which 
would violate the first priority objective 
of ensuring the security of the Soviet 
Union. But Soviet perceptions of the 
dangers of escalation may have been 
modified by the SALT negotiations, 
increasing their readiness to risk con-
frontation at sea, in pursuit of overseas 
goals. And this brings us back to the 
possibility and risks of involvement by 
the second superpower, in a military 
intervention initiated by the first. The 
later stages of the Angolan affair pro-
vide an example of one kind of situa-
tion. This was an overt, supportive 
intervention, initiated by the Soviet 
Union using proxy forces and shipping a 
large volume of military supplies by sea. 
The U.S. Navy certainly had the capa-
bility to impose a stop-and-search block-
ade on Angola in order to prevent this 
flow of supplies, but in fact took no 
action. Presumably to discourage any 
such interference, the Soviets deployed 
a Kresta and one or more cruise-missile-
armed submarines in a blocking posi-
tion. Certain points can be made. First, 
the nature of Soviet interests in Angola 
were not such as to justify the sinking 
of a U.S. warship on the high seas, 
particularly not a carrier, and a block-
ading force could have sailed through 
the Soviet patrol line with impunity. 
Second, the long-term political costs to 
the United States of imposing such a 
blockade would have been very high. It 
would have demonstrated to the Soviet 
leadership that Gorshkov was right 
when he argued that a powerful general-
purpose fleet was the essential foun-
dation of an independent overseas 
policy; it would have encouraged a shift 
in the allocation of resources in favor of 
increased naval building programs, and 
the construction of a large, balanced 
surface fleet, including aircraft carriers. 
Such costs could hardly be justified by 
the U.S. interests at stake. And third, in 
order to shape the Soviet Union's future 
expectations, what the United States 
could have done was to have dispatched 
a force of ships to sail through the 
Soviet patrol line, reverse course and 
return home, thereby showing that the 
U.S. Navy was not intimidated. As it 
happens, the Atlantic Fleet was engaged 
in other operations and was instructed 
to ignore the Soviet deployment; this 
was the next best thing, but still a long 
way short of optimal. 
(6) Soviet-U.S. Confrontation at 
Sea. But besides political commitment, 
there is also the question of effective 
military capability. The deployment of 
a U.S. carrier task force to the Indian 
Ocean in December 1971 during the 
Indo-Pakistan war may have been coun-
terproductive in political terms, but at 
least the force had a demonstrable 
military capability, which could be used 
if so wished. Not so in the Soviet case, 
despite the missile armament of their 
surface ships and submarines. Under 
what circumstances would these units 
have been ordered to attack the carrier? 
As soon as it readied its aircraft for 
takeoff to an unknown destination with 
an unknown weapon load? Or perhaps 
only after the aircraft had struck some 
target ashore? Perhaps the Soviet Union 
could claim they got some political 
mileage out of this operation, although 
they certainly risked being exposed as 
paper tigers. But their next deployment, 
in response to the mining of Haiphong 
was both militarily and politically point-
less; a fairly substantial force of surface 
ships and submarines sailed to the South 
China Sea, hung around for a few days, 
and then returned home. There was 
nothing effective that they could do. 
I am not persuaded by the suggestion 
that there now exists a set of tacit 
"rules" for the peacetime employment 
of naval force, which apply equally to 
the Soviet Union and the United 
States.21 The two powers have different 
levels of naval capability and very dif-
ferent interests and types of commit-
ment. Special account must be taken of 
Soviet interests in those areas of geo-
strategic importance to the security of 
the Russian homeland. But in most 
other circumstances, I consider that 
Soviet action at sea is largely condi-
tioned by their estimate of U.S. re-
actions, and as a general rule, the low 
level of Soviet commitment to "coun-
tering imperialist aggression" does not 
justify risking confrontation. 
The Soviet impulse to "counter im-
perialist aggression" is a longstanding 
one, as can be seen by the pattern of 
Soviet arms supply in the 1950's and 
1960's. So too is the Western impulse to 
react against the emergence of left wing 
regimes. And for many years, the situa-
tion could be described crudely in terms 
of the West conducting a dogged rear-
guard action against change, while the 
Soviet Union was the natural ally of his-
torical trends. But we are now 30 years 
down the road, there are few colonial 
territories left, and whatever their politi-
cal complexion, the newly independent 
states have national interests and wills 
of their own. The old ideological 
reasons for military intervention by the 
two superpowers have largely evapo-
rated, and it now becomes a question of 
picking sides in a traditional civil or 
interstate war. Given the transitory 
nature of political alignments, this 
would seem hardly worth the risks and 
costs involved. In the future, we may 
find that the main role of superpower 
intervention is to protect smaller states 
from the hegemonic tendencies of the 
emerging regional powers. 
There remains, however, the problem 
of Southern Africa. Although the West 
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is unhappy with the dominant white 
regimes, kith-and-kin and cultural fac-
tors constrain the type of support it is 
willing to afford the movement towards 
Black liberation, an ambivalence which 
provides excellent opportunities for 
Soviet influence-building. The possibili-
ties for their involvement are manifold, 
ranging from the supply of arms, to 
mounting a naval blockade to enforce a 
United Nations resolution on manda-
tory sanctions. Given that the area is 
remote from both Russia and the 
United States, and allowing that the 
Soviet Union may have downgraded the 
risks of escalation to general war, the 
pressures for an assertive policy will be 
strong, increasing the possibility of 
serious EastlWest confrontation. 
Overview. The maritime aspects of 
military intervention is too diffuse a 
subject to draw together in a few well 
chosen words, and to have discussed the 
problem without having addressed the 
prior question of the utility of military 
force, is like describing the mechanics of 
a religion without referring to its God. 
Certain points can, however, be made. 
The most obvious is that we now 
have a situation which is infinitely more 
complicated than that facing Palmerston 
in the heyday of gunboat diplomacy. 
For a start, the maritime environment is 
much more complex. We have the diffu-
sion of sophisticated weapon systems; 
the increased "reach" of coastal states; a 
change in international attitudes 
towards the rights of passage and the 
ownership of the sea; and the 
appearance of new "global" weapons 
for tactical use. 
The political environment is also 
much more complex. We have just 
passed through 30 years of radical 
change, which saw the dismantling of 
the Western colonial empires and an 
ideological competition for the favor of 
the newly emerging nations. We are now 
faced with an international system 
whose structure is hard to discern, with 
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a change in the nature of usable power 
and its distribution, and with a range of 
threats to human survival which _are 
altering national and international 
priorities and goals. Attitudes toward 
the use of coercive force by Great 
Powers have altered fundamentally, and 
new states do not "respond" to the 
threat of violence in the formerly 
accepted fashion. 
Missiles do not know their mums, 
and the proliferation of modern weap-
ons means that an increasing number of 
coastal states has some capability to 
prevent the use of their seas by both 
superpowers; narrow, shallow water-
ways are particularly vulnerable. The 
change in political attitudes means that 
maritime powers can no longer count on 
being able to use the seas unhindered 
for maritime intervention, and the ter-
minal leg of the sea lines of supply are 
now liable to attack. Meanwhile the 
political costs of forcing a passage 
through narrow waterways are likely to 
be so high that it is usually better to 
take an alternative route, where one 
exists, except when major interests are 
engaged and timeliness an issue. The 
economic costs of such diversion are 
generally less than would be expected. 
The utility of coercive intervention is 
increasingly in doubt, except for short, 
sharp, small-scale, rectifying operations, 
and possibly at the other end of the 
spectrum of violence, where the scale of 
operations changes "intervention" into 
"overseas war." Supportive intervention 
has a better record, but the increasing 
costs and risks raise the question of 
whether navies are necessarily the most 
effective instrument for such purposes. 
Aircraft carriers have an unmatched 
capability for bringing flexible fire-
power to bear in distant areas, but their 
high political symbolism and their need 
for sea room, place constraints on their 
unfettered use. Meanwhile the Russians 
have shown what can be done with 
merchant ships and airlift, making use 
of facilities in the,host country. 
Many of the attributes which in for-
mer times were the monopoly of naval 
forces, and gave them their special value 
as instruments of foreign policy, have 
now been dissipated or are shared by 
other instruments. The international 
news media and satellite surveillance 
mean that knowledge of warship move-
ments is no longer in the flag state's 
control, to be released (or not) as 
circumstances dictate. Naval units can 
no longer deploy the graduated range of 
violence that used to be at their dis-
posal, and the level of force needed to 
acllieve comparable results is very much 
higher. Violence (punishment) at the 
high end of the spectrum can now be in-
flicted on nonadjacent areas by aircraft 
and missiles, as well as by ship. In fact 
the air is often a viable, alternative 
means of gaining access to distant areas, 
and the response time is of quite a dif-
ferent order. Modem communications 
allow heads of state and other ministers 
to communicate their concerns, inter-
ests and intentions to their opponents in 
carefully chosen language, which com-
pares favorably with the crude signaling 
of naval deployments. And this explicit 
language can now be backed by latent 
force emplaced ashore. 
The latter is perhaps one of the more 
interesting possibilities which lie ahead. 
The advent of global systems which can 
deliver tactical weapons, opens up new 
ways of preventing the use of the sea or 
of providing direct support in distant 
parts of the world. In practical terms, 
there is not much difference between 
sinking a carrier with a salvo of tor-
pedoes, a 300-mile SSM or a 3,OOO-mile 
terminally guided ballistic missile. It is 
illogical to be concerned about two of 
these possibilities and to ignore the 
third; the difficulty of countering the 
ballistic missile makes it the much more 
potent threat. 
Despite these constraints and com-
plexities, in the foreseeable future there 
will continue to be situations where the 
sea will be the most appropriate means 
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of bringing traditional military force to 
bear in distant areas of the world. 
Changing circumstances will encourage 
progressive developments in the size and 
characteristics of naval units employed 
in this capacity, with particular em-
phasis on reducing the vulnerability and 
political salience of individual units. 
While making it lass likely that such 
units will be disabled, this will reduce 
the political costs if they are, and hence 
increase the general usefulness of this 
instrument. 
These changes in hardware will 
probably be easier to achieve than the 
even more necessary changes in tradi-
tional attitudes towards the role of 
naval force as an instrument of peace-
time foreign policy. "Send a Gunboat" 
can now do as much harm as good and 
the advantages of timeliness have to be 
weighed against the political costs in-
herent in forward deployment. The 
Soviet presence in distant sea areas such 
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as the Indian Ocean demands a careful 
evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
matching such deployments, compared 
with those of doing nothing and using 
the Soviet presence as a stick in the 
psychological competition for world 
influence. There is an urgent need for 
more selectivity in the type of naval 
force deployed and the occasions on 
which it is deployed. Carriers, which 
will continue to be operational through 
the tum of the century at least, are 
likely to be reserved for use in major 
planned interventions, involving sub-
stantial forces and political commit-
ment. Their more general role will be to 
contribute to the worldwide naval 
balance as a capability in being. 
Military intervention by sea will per-
sist as an instrument of Great Power 
policy, but there are likely to be con-
siderable changes both in its character 
and in its relative importance. 
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